come say hi at SPSP – coffee, sugar, and climate change – open and reproducible science

This week, at the society for personality and social psychology’s annual convention, I’m speaking in a symposium, rethinking health behavior change. I will talk about a study in which we* tested strategies to help people reduce the amount of sweetener added to their daily coffee (ideally without reducing enjoyment of it**). I’m also presenting a poster on how people talk to others about making behavioral changes that affect the environment.

One thing that excites me about these studies–they represent my first (admittedly clumsy) attempts at being completely reproducible and open with my science. Datasets, R analysis scripts, hypotheses, and all other study materials are publicly available***, and were preregistered****.

Openness and reproducibility in science fascinate me—both as a topic of research and as a guiding principle for my own research. Since starting graduate school, I have preregistered (nearly) all of my studies and have been working toward making the entire process transparent. I’ve also been learning how to write reproducible code in R. It has been challenging… you know, for the obvious reasons… misaligned incentives, human fallibility, complexity, and time. BUT, I’ve learned a lot (i think*****), and it has made me a better scientist (i think******). If nothing else, I can now make these cool graphs (below) for conference talks (and next time I won’t have to spend way too much time trying to make them look pretty*******).

Psych friends, come say hi at SPSP. Here’s the time and location for my talk and poster (and related scripts and files, here and here). Or, let’s just get a drink.

*me, Traci Mann, and Tim (our coffee connoisseur collaborator).

**that’s the hard part… sugar is yummy.

*** public project pages for the “coffee study” and “social message framing study” (the one climate change).

****an uneditable public archive of the study plan that is time-stamped prior to collecting (or looking at) data.

*****i welcome feedback and comments (particular on my R code). let me know if you find errors or have suggestions for improvement.

******hard to test empirically. though I’m pretty darn sure reproducibility and openness make Science better.

*******the beauty of reproducible code.

Sneak peek at SPSP presentation figures.

coffee

^Here’s the code (viewable in any web browser).

image-1-16-17-at-3-03-pm

^Here’s the code.

p.s. HT to Simine Vazire whose blog inspired the above footnote style. #usefulbloghack.

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What Do We Want our Scientific Discourse to Look Like?

I was recently quoted in an article appearing in the Observer, a publication of Association for Psychological Science. In the article Alison Ledgerwood quotes from a diverse set of voices in psychology on the topic of scientific discourse in part in response to Susan Fiske’s piece in the Observer. Fiske takes issue with methodological critics of psychological science (who she referred to as “methodological terrorists” in an earlier draft circulated online). Her article promoted many responses (see here) and a call led by Ledgerwood to write a more diverse (and less status-driven) article for the Observer on the topic. True to form, Alison quoted my writing fairly, and elegantly brought together many other contributions.

Here, I provide my small contribution in its entirety.

We would serve each other, and science as a whole, better if we treated critique and communication of science as an open and humble process of discovery and improvement. To this end, I would like to see our scientific discourse focus more on methodology and evidence. This is easier said than done. Criticisms of the science are often construed as criticisms of the scientist. Even when we, as scientists, appreciate the criticism and recognize its scientific value, it still evokes concerns that others will lose trust in us and in our research. It is no wonder people are distressed by methodological criticism. However, focusing our discourse on methodology and evidence, with more awareness of how tone and context influence others’ perceptions of the scientist whose work is under the microscope, will help ensure healthy development of our science. Second, I would like to see an increase in open and humble scientific discourse. Openness may make our mistakes and shortcomings more apparent, and it may make it easier for others to critique our work, but it will surely improve our science. If we simultaneously place more value on humble communication, I expect criticisms will feel less personal and be easier to swallow as well. Finally, as a graduate student, I feel vulnerable publicly stating my thoughts on criticism and openness in science, which speaks to the climate of our discourse. It is essential that we have a communication environment in which graduate students, post-docs, and junior faculty from all backgrounds are rewarded for humbly and openly presenting methodologically sound ideas, research, and criticisms.

Meehl on theory testing, never gets old.

The position of Popper and the neo-Popperians is that we do not “induce” scientific theories by some kind of straightforward upward seepage from the clearly observed facts, nor do we “confirm” theories as the Vienna positivists supposed. All we can do is to subject theories—including the wildest and “unsupported” armchair conjectures (for a Popperian, completely kosher)’— to grave danger of refutation…

A theory is corroborated to the extent that we have subjected it to such risky tests; the more dangerous tests it has survived, the better corroborated it is. If I tell you that Meehl’s theory of climate predicts that it will rain sometime next April, and this turns out to be the case, you will not be much impressed with my “predictive success.” Nor will you be impressed if I predict more rain in April than in May, even showing three asterisks (for p < .001) in my t-test table! If I predict from my theory that it will rain on 7 of the 30 days of April, and it rains on exactly 7, you might perk up your ears a bit, but still you would be inclined to think of this as a “lucky coincidence.” But suppose that I specify which 7 days in April it will rain and ring the bell; then you will start getting seriously interested in Meehl’s meteorological conjectures. Finally, if I tell you that on April 4th it will rain 1.7 inches (.66 cm), and on April 9th, 2.3 inches (.90 cm) and so forth, and get seven of these correct within reasonable tolerance, you will begin to think that Meehl’s theory must have a lot going for it. You may believe that Meehl’s theory of the weather, like all theories, is, when taken literally, false, since probably all theories are false in the eyes of God, but you will at least say, to use Popper’s language, that it is beginning to look as if Meehl’s theory has considerable verisimilitude, that is, “truth-like-ness.”

Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: The slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806–834. doi:10.1037//0022-006X.46.4.806

Can Theory Change What it is a Theory About?

In Beyond Freedom and Dignity B.F. Skinner writes, “no theory changes what it is a theory about; man remains what he has always been.” By this Skinner means that the underlying rules or processes that guide human behavior are constant, and that knowledge of these processes does not change their nature. However, throughout the social psychological literature we see suggestions of just the opposite—knowledge of a psychological process can change the psychological process. For example, Schmader (2010) provides evidence that simply teaching people about stereotype threat may “inoculate them against its effects.” The theory of social identity threat postulates that people are sensitive to contexts that threaten their identity, and when such a situation is detected people engage in ruminative conflict that can distract them enough to undermine their performance in that setting. Schmader is claiming that giving people knowledge of psychological processes predicted by theory changes the processes that unfold. This point raises several important questions: what is a psychological theory? Does psychological theory describe stable processes in the Skinnerian sense? Can we think of psychological theory in the same way that we think about theories of say physics or biology? If we believe theory must have some element of stability (e.g., if we believe light traveled at the same speed in the middle ages as it does today), and that theories exist out side of and are independent from our knowledge of their existence (e.g. the theory of special and general relativity existed before Einstein identified them, and his discovery did not change their quality), then can we classify social psychological theories as theories? My sense is no. Or maybe we need to modify our definition of what qualifies as a theory. Or perhaps our definition of stability in the processes that underlie phenomena and our belief that observation is independent from underlying processes needs modification.

References

Schmader, T. (2010). Stereotype Threat Deconstructed. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19, 14–18. doi:10.1177/0963721409359292

 

 

a thought on personal record keeping

The weight of what has gone undocumented can be burdensome. If you are like me, you may find the struggle to find a balance between experiencing and recording life taxing. However, I believe the record keeping process holds the potential to enrich what has been lived and release the pressure of experience, the pressure to hold onto memories. Writing relieves the mental strain required to remember, clearing the way for fuller experience of the current moment. But too much record keeping is like watching the sun set over the Taj Mahal through a video camera–You’re so busy recording what’s happening that you fail to truly experience the happening. Writing about past experiences is never an act of transcription nor is it an act independent of the present. The act recreates the memory, it attempts to reflect what was felt, and in doing so it reshapes your present moment.

 

impression management and open science

I love this Charles H. Cooley (1902, p. 320) quote on how self-presentational concerns have institutional and professional forms (including in science, gasp!)

If we never tried to seem a little better than we are, how could we improve or “train ourselves from the outside inward?” And the same impulse to show the world a better or idealized aspect of ourselves finds an organized expression in the various professions and classes, each of which has to some extent a cant or pose, which its members assume unconsciously, for the most part, but which has the effect of a conspiracy to work upon the credulity of the rest of the world. There is a cant not only of theology and of philanthropy, but also of law, medicine, teaching, even of science—perhaps especially of science, just now, since the more a particular kind of merit is recognized and admired, the more it is likely to be assumed by the unworthy.

The unveiling of fraudulent research among highly acclaimed scientists along with the advent of new computing and archiving technologies has driven a recent (depending on how you measure it) push from within the scientific community for more “open” practices. The debate around open science and reluctance in adopting its practices are rarely discussed in terms of interpersonal processes. However, discussions of open science are discussions about the presentation of scientific research to other scientists and the public. I think the relevance of impression management processes to calls for more openness in science is an area worth exploring in more detail. I’d like to write more on this, please post in the comments if you know of anyone who has written on this topic.

References

Coole, C.H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York, NY: C. Scribner’s sons.

thoughts on impression management, feminism, pronoun use, and social justice

Deegan (2013) critiques Goffman’s (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life as a model of patriarchal use of language and irony, “to perpetuate gender inequality” (p. 79). In Deegan’s conversations with the sociological giant, Goffman laments that he struggles to find a good alternative to the pronoun “he” and that feminists have missed the irony in his use of examples that stereotypically depict woman as subordinate. In turn, Degan suggests using “he/she” or gender neutral pronouns such as “congressperson”. She also makes a strong case for how irony in a patriarchal world perpetuates oppression. Such “joking around” fails to challenge repressive behavior and places the repressed in the awkward position of feeling obligated to laugh at a joke at their own expense, which validates repressive social structures. Irony used in this way is an impression management strategy used by the patriarchy to explicitly acknowledge social injustice while simultaneously reinforcing the power structure.

The feminist movement has made substantial strides since the 1970s due, in no small part, to rethinking how to use language in a way that questions established social hierarchy. This feminist approach to social change is paralleled in other social movements with similar results. Take, for example, the fight for marriage-equality. Whether it was strategic or a consequence of the legal and language structures of the time, the homosexual community adopted terms such as “partner” or “life-partner” to describe what they viewed to be a relationship of equivalent status to that of “husband” or “wife.” Similar to “congressperson,” “partner” is a more general noun that neutralizes the (often fast and strong) urge to code gender. The effect has three consequences for the role of impression management in social change. First, when conversations about relationship status are unavoidable, it helps the homosexual actor retain control and power over the observers’ impression of their relationship and sexual orientation. Generally, it is rude to pry further into their relationship, thus using “partner” to answer relationship questions maintains the “line” of conversation and the actor’s power. Second, the use of more general nouns subtly cues the audience to question the status quo. By neutralizing gender, the noun “partner” introduces a state of uncertainty in the mind of the observer, which naturally leads to questions such as “Am I using the right noun?” Or “Why did they say it that way?” These questions break the automaticity of oppressive assumptions about the relationship between sexual orientation, language, and status. The third consequence of adopting a more general noun is that it enables subtle displays of solidarity with the movement. Many heterosexual couples started using the noun “partner” to describe their wife or husband. Couples that use “partner” synonymously with “husband/wife” are both reshaping the meaning associate with the word and signaling that they endorse the movement. These couples are also normalizing this meaning of “partner,” which blurs the social order repressing the homosexual community.

This analysis sheds light on how strategies of impression management have social justice implications. How can other contemporary groups facing social repression, such as the transgender community, manipulate language and gesture to effectively manage and reshape the impression of others? In a recent conversation, a friend expressed annoyance with what he called, “political correctness” training. His employer required a discussion about changing perspectives on the use of gendered identifiers, such as “he/she”, in the direction of third more neutral term such as “they.” To my surprise, he lamented that this would completely change how we use language. The transgender community faces a different (and perhaps more difficult) set of challenges than those faced by feminists and marriage-equality advocates, but I suspect that the use of “they” or similar terms will follow a similar trend to the use of “partner” and “congressperson.”

References

Deegan, M. J. (2013). Goffman on gender, sexism, and feminism: A summary of notes on a conversation with Erving Goffman and my reflections then and now. Symbolic Interaction, 37, 71-86. doi: 10.1002/symb.85

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.